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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1897 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD ALLEN WOLFE, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:99-cr-00256-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Malachy E. Mannion 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 4, 2019 
 
Before:  CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, District 
Judge+. 
 
(Filed April 29, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
  
                                              
+ The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg, United States District Judge of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Richard Allen Wolfe challenges the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
motion.  He argues that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), renders the 
residual clause of the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender 
provision — pursuant to which he was sentenced — unconstitutionally vague.  This 
argument is untimely under United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, No. 18-8435, 2019 WL 1243704 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019), and we will affirm the 
District Court.   
I. 
We write principally for the parties and therefore recite only those facts necessary 
to our decision.  Wolfe was found guilty of bank robbery with a dangerous weapon, 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(d), in 1999 and sentenced in 2000.  He was found to be a career offender 
under United States Sentencing Guideline (the “Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.2(a) 
and sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.  
When Wolfe was sentenced, the Guidelines were mandatory.1  See Green, 898 F.3d at 
320.   
On direct appeal, we affirmed Wolfe’s conviction, United States v. Wolfe, 245 
F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001), and the Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari, 
Wolfe v. United States, 534 U.S. 880 (2001). 
                                              
1 In 2005, the Supreme Court excised “the provision of the federal sentencing 
statute that ma[de] the Guidelines mandatory,” which rendered them “effectively 
advisory.”  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).   
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In June 2016, Wolfe moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate and correct his 
sentence based on Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557, which established that the residual clause 
of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague.  Because, at 
the time of Wolfe’s sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause contained language 
identical to ACCA’s residual clause,2 he asserted that, per Johnson, the former was also 
unconstitutional.  The District Court dismissed Wolfe’s motion as untimely but granted 
him a certificate of appealability.  Wolfe timely appealed to this Court.   
II. 
The District Court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and (c).  We review de novo the District Court’s 
conclusions of law and review the court’s findings of fact for clear error.  United States v. 
Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014).   
III.  
Wolfe’s appeal raises the question whether the ruling in Johnson applies to the 
formerly mandatory Guidelines:  specifically, the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a).  This 
Court recently determined that a motion challenging the residual clause of the mandatory 
Guidelines based on Johnson is untimely.  See Green, 898 F.3d at 321–23.  Wolfe asks 
                                              
2 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56 (“The [ACCA] defines ‘violent felony’ as . . 
. ‘any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (1998) (“The term 
‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”) (emphasis added).   
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this Court to “revisit its holding in Green and allow [him] to proceed on his motion to 
correct sentence.”  Wolfe Br. 12. 
That we cannot do.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (“It is the tradition of this court that the 
holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  Thus, no 
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a previous panel.  
Court en banc consideration is required to do so.”); see also Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 
858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that where a prior panel’s precedential 
opinion has not been “overruled by a decision of this Court en banc,” a subsequent panel 
is left with no “discretion to rule otherwise absent a contrary ruling by the Supreme 
Court”).  As Green has not been overruled by this Court en banc, or overruled or rejected 
by the Supreme Court, it binds this panel.   
Thus, pursuant to Green, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Wolfe’s 
motion as untimely.  A defendant may file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion within a year of a 
series of dates, of which the most pertinent to this appeal are “the date on which the 
judgment of conviction becomes final” and “the date on which the right asserted was 
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), (3).  Wolfe argued before the District Court and this Court that his 
motion, filed nearly fifteen years after the Supreme Court’s October 1, 2001 denial of his 
petition for writ of certiorari, was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), as it was filed 
within a year of Johnson.  Because “Johnson did not recognize a right to bring a 
vagueness challenge to the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines,” Wolfe “cannot rely on 28 
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U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) to restart his applicable statute of limitations period,” rendering his 
motion untimely.  Green, 898 F.3d at 321.   
IV. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Wolfe’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as untimely.   
